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*This paper reports research undertaken in a project on the opti-
mal structure of capital transfers from developed to developing
countries; financial support was provided by the Deutsche For-
schungsgemeinschaft.I. Introduction
In the literature, the persistent debt crisis of the 1980s has
mainly been interpreted as the consequence of mounting difficul-
ties of developing countries to service their external debt as
formerly agreed. Consequently, the default issue was raised in
terms of the debt-servicing capacity of debtor countries, i.e.
their ability to pay. Various models were built along these
lines . Applying logit analysis, discriminant analysis or prin-
cipal component analysis, financial indicators such as the debt-
service ratio, the ratio of external debt to exports and/or GDP,
and external reserves to imports, as well as economic performance
variables such as export growth and domestic inflation proved to
be statistically significant in explaining debt-service problems.
However, most of these models failed as an early-warning device.
Among the reasons for this failure the missing sovereign-risk
perspective of the models addressing the debtor's ability to pay
can be supposed to figure prominently. Default is not only a
matter of debt-servicing capacity, but also of the debtor's wil-
lingness to pay. The issue of willful default or debt repudiation
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has been taken up only recently . Contrary to credit contracts in
the national realm, debt servicing is hardly enforceable by cre-
ditors in the international context. After the contract is con-
cluded and the capital is transferred, a substantial range of
discretion accrues to the debtor [Jensen, Meckling, 1976, pp.
308f.]. The honouring of contractual obligations becomes a matter
of cost-benefit calculus.
Basically, the relationship between creditors and debtors can be
characterized by a principal-agent situation, where the agent
(debtor) has the choice between cooperative and non-cooperative
strategies (e.g., servicing or repudiating foreign debt). The
See e.g. Feder, Just [1977]; Abassi, Taffler [1982]; Schmidt
[1984]; Cline [1984]; for an overview on these and other stu-
dies on debt-servicing problems, see Amelung, Mehltretter
[1986].
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See e.g. Eaton, Gersovitz [1981a; 1981b]; Sachs [1983]; Sachs,
Cohen [1982]; LSchler [1985].principal (creditor) may react by embarking on non-cooperative
strategies as well, for example by foreclosing future access to
capital. Probably, the recent congestion of defaults in various
developing countries and the refusal of commercial banks to pro-
vide fresh money to problem borrowers indicate a shift towards
non-cooperative principal-agent relations. In the following ana-
lysis, an attempt is made to address this question empirically by
testing the relevance of the notion of willful default. This is
done by subjecting major hypotheses on debt repudiation to logit
analysis, which allows to identify the impact of different fac-
tors on the probability of default .
The relevance of this analysis stems from the fact that in the
longer run both borrowers and creditors would be better off in a
2
cooperative situation . A commitment to cooperative behaviour by
the debtors reduces the credit risk faced by the lenders; this,
in turn, allows the borrowers a better bargain on the credit
terms. Otherwise, the existence of sovereign risk may have as a
consequence that the amount of capital transferred to developing
countries remains below its optimal level [Allen, 1983; Eaton,
Gersovitz, 1981a; 1981b], Moreover, it was argued that the in-
vestment level of debtors is higher under cooperative conditions
[LSchler, 1985, pp. 25-28], which would help to prevent future
debt crises. In order to pave the way for the return to more
cooperative borrower-creditor relations, the major economic in-
centives and disincentives for willful default have to be ana-
lysed in the first place.
This article proceeds with the presentation of some hypotheses on
willful default which have been raised in the literature (Section
II), the description of the basic logit model (Section III), and
the specification of the estimation equations and the data ap-
plied (Section IV). In Section V, the empirical results are pre-
sented. Finally, some preliminary conclusions are drawn, and the
next steps required to improve the financial relations between
debtors and creditors are outlined.
This approach was also applied in an earlier paper by one of
the authors [Picht, 1988].
2
For a detailed presentation, see LSchler [1985],II. Hypotheses on Willful Default
The notion of willful default on debt, as applied in the fol-
lowing, implies rationality on the part of the borrowers, i.e.,
the Third-World governments. Their decisions are supposed to
depend on the specific set of incentives they face. The incentive
structure prevailing in country A may render debt repudiation an
attractive option; whereas country B may face a situation where
punctually servicing its obligations is in the country's best
interest. Basically, we assumed that governments of developing
countries seek the country's benefit, rather than their own bene-
fit. The hypotheses on willful default largely concentrate on
macro-economic variables. Public-choice reasoning would suggest,
in turn, that the government agents are not eager to maximize the
public welfare, but rather take decisions that improve their own
well-being. It is left open in the present analysis to which
extent the government's and the country's interests differ in the
case of default decisions. This limitation should be kept in mind
when interpreting the empirical results.
The hypotheses on willful default address the potential costs and
benefits from debt repudiation for the country in question. In
general terms, it would be rational to default on debt if the
benefits arising from such a decision exceed the costs . As far
as the benefits are concerned, we may reasonably expect that the
gains to be reaped from debt repudiation depend on the degree of
2
foreign indebtedness, respectively the debt-service burden . The
higher the (discounted) net value of the contractual obligations
For the pioneering work in this respect, see Eaton, Gersovitz
[1981a; 1981b], Sachs [1983], and Sachs, Cohen [1982].
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On the other hand, it may be reasoned that high foreign in-
debtedness reflects a favourable credit standing of the country
in question in international financial markets. If this were
the case, governments may speculate to get hold of even more
external resources before willful default becomes an attractive
policy option. However, recent experience renders this argument
rather implausible for most of the heavily indebted Third-World
economies. Especially for Latin-American borrowers, the credit
standing has deteriorated dramatically; these countries, face
severe difficulties to raise fresh money.is that are refused to be paid, the higher the benefit is for
borrowers which otherwise would have to forgo domestic resources
when the credits are due [Eaton, Gersovitz, 1981b, p. 302],
However, it is not only the amount of foreign resources the bor-
rower can get hold of, on which the decisions to default may be
based on. According to an argument advanced by L&chler [1985, pp.
29ff.], countries are more inclined to repudiate their debt when
national income is lower than previously expected by both lenders
and borrowers. In this case, the benefits from default rise rela-
tive to the potential costs; whereas the benefit-cost relation
declines when national income is unexpectedly high. In contrast
to dividend payments due to obligations from direct foreign in-
vestments which vary according to the host country's economic
performance, debt contracts involve a pre-fixed payment schedule.
The debt-service profile previously agreed on by the borrower and
the lender is based on forecasts on the country's future capacity
to meet its obligations. If the assumptions on the income growth
to be achieved prove over-optimistic, the borrower has to trans-
fer a higher share of the incremental income to the creditor.
This is likely to strengthen the resistance to punctually ser-
vicing the debt. Furthermore, the costs of default are supposed
to be positively related to the actual income level, whatever
form the penalties from the creditor side may take; i.e., the
costs are lower in situations of unexpected income drops. The
likelihood of willful default is thus hypothesized to be higher
(lower), when national income is unexpectedly low (high).
As far as the costs of default are concerned, the borrowers have
to consider possible sanctions imposed by their creditors or by
related parties as well. Creditor countries may agree on trade
embargos as a retaliatory measure against borrowers that default
willfully [Sachs, 1983, p. 20; van Eden, Herken-Krauer, Vasic,
1985, p. 16]. This possibility threatens to affect the economic
prospects of borrowers negatively, particularly if developing
countries depend heavily on imports of essential investment and
intermediate goods. The likelihood of willful default is thus
supposed to be negatively related to the relative importance ofimports in domestic absorption. Even without.outright trade em-
bargos, this hypothesis retains its plausibility. High import
dependence typically implies high dependence on short-term trade
credits provided by exporters. In the case of willful default,
exporters may be prepared to continue trade relations on a cash
or pre-payment basis only, because they fear that export credits
will be subject to default as well. This is likely to severely
affect external trade transactions. The threat of retaliatory
actions is also high for aid-dependent developing countries.
Donor governments may refuse further bilateral aid payments and
press international organisations to stop multilateral assistance
for defaulting borrowers . This weakens the incentive to repudi-
ate foreign debt. High aid figures indicate the amount of sub-
sidized capital that would be available in the future provided
that the borrower strived for cooperative relations to its cre-
ditors. Consequently, the costs of default - i.e., the external
assistance forgone - are the greater, the higher the reliance on
aid inflows is.
The borrowers are supposed to take into account that additional
costs may arise from willful default. Most importantly, de-
faulting countries, in the presence of cross-default clauses, are
likely to be cut off from international capital markets; i.e., it
would be extremely difficult to obtain fresh money from the
banking community [Folkerts-Landau, 1985, p. 330]. The potential
costs involved depend on whether or not borrowers want to attract
foreign capital on a commercial basis in the future as well. This
is likely to be the case if favourable growth prospects indicate
that foreign capital inflows can be used productively. High eco-
nomic growth rates typically reflect high marginal productivity
of capital. If the latter exceeds the interest rate to be paid in
international capital markets, the borrowing country is able to
improve its economic welfare by raising further credits. The
larger the difference between capital productivity and credit
For the United States, explicit reference can be made to the
Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961;
see the Appendix in Knudsen [1972, pp. 326-327] and, for a
critical discussion, Gilbert [1977, pp. 515-550].costs is, the larger the amount of foreign resources is that can
be absorbed productively. According to this reasoning, a favour-
able growth performance weakens the incentive to default willful-
ly. Alternatively, it may be argued that "rapidly growing coun-
tries may have less incentive to repay loans, since they do not
expect to enter the market again after the period in which a net
payment of loans is necessary" [Eaton, Gersovitz, 1981a, p. 16].
In other words, the non-repayment would save the country re-
sources, and the threat of foreclosing future access to credit
markets by commercial banks would not do much harm under such
circumstances.
A further hypothesis on the costs of debt repudiation relates to
short-term fluctuations in economic activity [Eaton, Gersovitz,
1981a, pp. 8f.]. Borrowing abroad can smooth domestic absorption
intertemporarily. For example, the government may be inclined to
raise credits in international financial markets when national
consumption is suppressed due to cyclical downswings; this is
because the marginal utility of consumption of its constituency
can be assumed to be high when income is relatively low. During
the subsequent upswing, the marginal utility decreases and the
credits can be paid back. Governments which intend to smooth the
impact of cyclical swings on domestic consumption in the future
will be reluctant to repudiate their debt. In the case of willful
default, the banks will probably refuse to play their role in
this mechanism any longer. A similar reasoning refers to short-
term variations in investment and export earnings. The willing-
ness of commercial banks to extend credits in order to stabilize
investment and to compensate for temporary export shortfalls may
save the country considerable adjustment and transition costs. It
can thus be hypothesized that the incentive to default is nega-
tively related to the degree of fluctuations in economic activity
typically prevailing in a borrowing country.
The borrowers may try to reduce the potential costs of default
arising from the creditors
1 threat to foreclose future access to
the international capital market by counterthreats. A single
borrower's odds to get away with no or only modest costs arehigher if it is decided to default when other borrowers do so as
well. Parallel behaviour of a number of developing countries may
create fairly large problems for the liquidity and solvency posi-
tion of the commercial banks involved, even if a default by each
single debtor country would not affect the banks seriously. Faced
by the counterthreat of a debtors' cartel, the creditors may be
prepared to compromise on sanctions. The likelihood for a speci-
fic country to default is thus expected to increase if other
countries decide to repudiate their debt as well (bandwagon ef-
fect) . But even a single large borrower may be powerful enough
to match the potential penalties of creditors by counterthreats.
Largeness may refer to the amount of total debt accumulated by a
country. The huge sum of outstanding credits can be used as an
instrument to press for concessions by the commercial banks; be-
cause otherwise, i.e., in the case of an outright debt repudia-
tion, the stability of the international financial system may be
affected negatively. Creditor countries may also be willing to
refrain from retaliatory measures if the debtor country re-
presents an important export market for them. It can thus be
hypothesized that the likelihood of willful default varies posi-
tively with the economic and political weight of borrowers.
III. The Test Format: Logit Model
The coverage of possible explanations of default seems fairly
complete, if measured on what has been advanced as empirically
testable conjectures in the literature. Each of the hypotheses
presented above deals with partial explanations of debt repudia-
tion by developing countries. We did not aim at including all of
them in a comprehensive and consistent theoretical model; we
This reasoning differs from the argument of Eaton, Gersovitz
[1981a, p. 14], who pointed to high economic interdependence
between different borrowers which might explain simultaneous
defaults. According to our hypothesis, parallel debt repudia-
tion may even occur if the economic ties between debtors are
rather weak.rather put the theoretically meaningful partial hypotheses to-
gether in a multivariate framework, which allows to single out
the most relevant variables with respect to the developing coun-
tries' decisions on debt repudiation.
We applied logit analysis on the basis of cross-country data.
This technique is well-suited for the case in question, where the
phenomenon to be explained, i.e., the existence or non-existence
of default, can only be measured as [0/1] alternatives. Logit
analysis has several advantages as compared to other methods.
OLS-regression analysis is inadequate when the dependent variable
is restricted to the [0/1] space. Simple linear regressions may
generate probabilities below 0 and above 1 for the dependent
variable [Pindyck, Rubinfeld, 1981, pp. 275ff]. The non-linear
transformations suggested by logit, or else, by probit models
avoid this problem. The estimation results of logit and probit
analyses for equal data sets are quite comparable [Altman et al.,
1981, pp. 31 ff. ]; but the former offers computational advantages
due to the iterative technique implied. Multiple discriminant
analysis represents a possible alternative, which was applied in
comparable studies [e.g. Frank, Cline, 1971], The major advant-
ages of the logit approach are that it avoids a-priori classifi-
cations into defaulting and non-defaulting countries and that it
provides straightforward testing of the significance of the vari-
ous coefficients .
Logit analysis allows to assess the likelihood (P) of default as
a function of a set of explanatory variables (X):
(1) P(l) = [1 + exp -(a+bX)I"
1
Thereby, a and b represent the estimation coefficients. Eq. (1)
is subjected to maximum likelihood estimation procedure. It is
important to note that the coefficient b must not be confounded
For a detailed discussion of the application and the conceptual
limits of discriminant and logit analysis, see Klecka [1975]
and Altman et al. [1981].with the partial derivative. The latter is given by
(2) dP(l)/dX =
where P stands for a chosen base level of the probability of
default. This formula can be used to calculate predicted changes
in the probability of default for a given change in the indepen-
dent variable [Altman et al., 1981, p. 33].
IV. Specification of the Model and Data Base
In moving from the basic-model level to empirical testing, it had
to be decided as to how to define the dependent variable, and
appropriate indicators had to be identified for the explaining
variables. As concerns the dependent variable, we referred to
World-Bank data on multilateral debt renegotiations [World Bank,
1985, p. 28], The analysis covers 53 developing countries. Prin-
cipally, "1" was attached to countries that renegotiated part of
their debt with the Paris Club, other aid consortia, or commer-
cial banks in the 1981-1984 period; if no renegotiations took
place, the variable was set as "0" . This procedure involves
methodological problems insofar as the rescheduling events do not
present a complete picture on willful defaults. Other forms of
default may not be captured; this refers mainly to unilateral
debt repudiation by the borrower. However, this restriction of
the analysis, which is due to data limitations, is unlikely to
distort the empirical results. In the 1981-1984 period covered in
the following analysis, no cases are known to us where defaulting
countries did not reach a rescheduling agreement with their cre-
ditors finally. Hence, it can be argued that the dependent vari-
able is "1" for all countries that refused to service their debt
unilaterally.
Alternatively, "1" was attached to countries where the total
amount of debt rescheduled in the 1981-1984 period exceeded 15
per cent of outstanding debt. This is because countries that
renegotiated only marginal proportions of their debt might be
considered as non-default cases rather than default cases; this
applied to Pakistan (2.7 per cent), Guyana (5 per cent), Hon-
duras (10 per cent) , and Uganda (11 per cent) . However, the
estimation results did not change considerably when this ad-
justment was made. Consequently, the detailed results of this
variant are not presented in Section V.10
More importantly, the rescheduling events may not only reflect
willful default, i.e., an unwillingness, to pay, but also an in-
ability to pay due to exogenously created insolvency or illiqui-
dity . To avoid biased results, the latter possibility had to be
taken into account in the empirical estimations. This was done by
supplementing the set of hypotheses on willful default by a vari-
able which captures the influence of external shocks on the re-
2
scheduling event. The equation estimated can then be written as :
(3) P(l) e [l + exp - (aQ + a1X1 + •--a^ + an+1ES)]"
1,
where:
X. , ...X = variables that indicate possible influences on
. .
 n willful default;
ES - external-shock variable.
By ES, the balance-of-payments impact of world-market develop-
ments which were assumed to be beyond the control of individual
3
debtor nations was measured . ES encompasses terms-of-trade ef-
fects, real world-demand effects and interest-rate effects, all
as a percentage share of the sum of the country's exports and im-
4
ports . Since the reschedulings of the 1981-1984 period are to be
explained, the balance-of-payments impact was calculated for the
preceding three years, i.e. 1978-1980. The 1975-1977 period re-
presented the reference period for price and interest-rate chan-
ges; the difference between actual world demand in 1978-1980 and
its hypothetical trend volumes was estimated on the basis of pro-
jections applying the average growth rate observed in 1971-1977
(in what follows, the external-shock variable is denoted as N).
As concerns the partial hypotheses on willful default presented
4 above, the following indicators were considered :
For the distinction between repudiation, insolvency and il-
liquidity, see Sachs [1983]; Aliber [1980].
2
In all cases, the constant term a- was included to make sure
that, if the explaining variables were zero, the likelihood
estimated is not preset to either 0 or 1.
For a detailed discussion of the methodological issues in-
volved, see Nunnenkamp [1986, Chapter 5].
4
For the calculation procedures and exact definitions, see the
detailed presentation in the Appendix.11
- Different proxies indicate the potential benefits from default,
i.e. the amount of resources saved by not servicing foreign
debt. We referred to three alternatives: outstanding debt in
per cent of the debtor's gross national product (in the fol-
lowing B), debt per capita of the borrowing country's popula-
tion (A), and total debt-service payments relative to GNP (C).
- The empirical test of the hypothesis that borrowers were more
inclined to default when national income was unexpectedly low
required to make assumptions on the expected income growth. We
tried two variants: Firstly, the unforeseen change in economic
growth was calculated as the difference between actual average
GDP-per-capita growth in the 1981-1984 period (in real terms)
and the long-term growth trend experienced throughout the
1970s (E) . Alternatively, a shorter and more recent reference
period was chosen, i.e. 1978-1980 (F).
-The debtors' exposure to possible sanctions of creditor coun-
tries was measured in terms of the borrowers' imports, as a
percentage share of gross domestic product (K), and in terms of
foreign aid inflows per capita of the borrowers' population
(I).
rr Average growth in per-capita incomes in the 1970-1980 period
was supposed to capture the conflicting hypotheses on the im-
pact of the longer-term economic performance on the likelihood
of default (D).
- The standard deviations of the residuals of, first, GDP per
capita (G) and, second, exports (H) , derived from trend es-
timates for the 1970s, represent alternative measures of the
degree of short-term fluctuations in economic activity. Ac-
cording to the reasoning in Section II, they were expected to
be negatively related to the likelihood of default.
- The chances of individual borrowers to match possible penalties
of creditors by counterthreats were measured by the total US$-
value of outstanding debt (M) and by the share of developed
countries' exports shipped to the respective debtor country
(L)
1.
The hypothesis that parallel behaviour of debtors increased the
likelihood of debt repudiation could not be tested in the con-
text of the following cross-country analysis.12 " •••" -•»••' • > "' "
Table 1 summarizes the partial hypotheses on default and presents
the . expected signs of the explaining variables that entered our
empirical analysis. •. . .








































per cent of imports
plus exports , +
1978-80
Total debt service to GNP. - Standard deviation of residuals.
-
 cImports of the sample countries from the European Community,
Japan, and the United States, as a percentage share of the
latter countries' total exports. - Balance-of-payments impact
of changes in the terms of trade, interest rates, and real
world-market demand in 1978-1980, vis-a-vis 1975-1977; the cal-
culation of the external-shock variable was so that it is the
more positive, the stronger negative external shocks were (such
as declining export prices, rising import prices, and rising
interest rates); for details of calculations, see the Appendix.
To perform our cross-country analysis, we referred to a sample of
5 3 developing economies for which the required informations were
available. The data base is presented in Table Al. The sample
covered a wide spectrum of developing countries in terms of in-
come levels, economic growth, foreign indebtedness, the structure
of capital imports, and the relative success or failure to ser-
vice foreign debt on schedule. All 53 countries entered the em-
pirical estimates in the first step. Subsequently, we imposedBibliothek
69 Institute fur Weltwirfcchoft
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various restrictions, mainly in terms of income levels and the
relative importance of different types of creditors, in order to
consider important subgroups of the sample specifically.
Table A2 reveals that the empirical analysis on the determinants
of default was subject to some multicollinearity problems. Rela-
tively high correlations between independent variables did not
create difficulties in those cases where alternative indicators
for the same explaining factor are involved (e.g., outstanding
debt per capita, debt in per cent of GNP, and debt-service bur-
den) . High Pearson-correlation coefficients may distort the em-
pirical results only if the variables in question were supposed
to enter the logit analysis simultaneously (e.g., development aid
per capita and the import/GDP ratio). In such cases, multicolli-
nearity problems were avoided by excluding specific variables
from the estimation. Section V presents estimates for different
combinations of explaining variables where multicollinearity
problems were minimized in this way.
V. Empirical Results
Before running the multivariate estimations, we applied logit
analysis to each of the aforementioned explaining variables se-
parately. All partial default estimates, presented in Table A3,
show the expected signs for the coefficients of the independent
variables. For the long-term growth indicator, where competing
hypotheses were raised in the literature, the coefficient is
negative. The argument that rapidly growing countries opted for
default since they did not expect to rely on further capital
imports in the future is, thus, not supported. However, the ex-
planatory power of the partial calculations remains extremely
limited. The average likelihood of the estimates hardly exceeds
50 per cent . Moreover, only the coefficient of the development-
aid variable is statistically significant at the 10 per cent
level.
Since the phenomenon to be explained, i.e., the existence or
non-existence of default, could only be measured as [0/1] al-
ternatives, the bottom line of the probability estimated by
logit analysis was given by 50 per cent.14
The quality of the estimations in terms of correctly identifying
default and non-default cases improved only slightly when the
multivariate approach was applied to all 53 sample countries; the
highest average likelihood reported in Table 2 amounts to 56 per
cent. The evidence on some of our hypotheses is considerably
stronger, however, as compared to the partial calculations. With
only two exceptions (for variable H, i.e., the fluctuations in
exports, in equations 9 and 10), all coefficients reveal the ex-
pected signs. Among the variables that are significant at the 10
per cent level or better, long-term growth of GDP (variable D)
figures prominently. In five out of six equations where D was
included, the coefficient is significantly negative. Thus, the
hypothesis that a favourable growth performance weakened the
incentive to default is strongly supported. Apparently, fast-
growing economies were prepared to attract further capital in-
flows in the future, since foreign capital could be absorbed
productively. These countries faced strong incentives to refrain
from willful default, because otherwise they might be cut off
from international capital markets and their economic performance
was likely to suffer from the creditors
1 sanctions.
For the remaining variables, the evidence is riot as strong. This
refers particularly to variables A, B, and C, which were supposed
to capture the economic benefits of debt repudiation. All coeffi-
cients of the debt indicators and the debt-service burden re-
mained insignificant. It may be concluded that willful defaults
were motivated by other than macro-economic considerations, e.g.
by internal political pressures that were not related to social
cost-benefit calcules. This reasoning is .supported by the ob-
servation that variables L arid M, indicating the debtors
1 po-
tential to match possible sanctions of the creditors by counter-
threats, remained insignificant as well. In this instance, how-
ever, other economic factors should also be irrelevant, which was
not the case. Countries seemed more inclined to repudiate their
debt when national income was lower than previously expected.
According to the argument raised by LSchler [1985], this behavi-
our is economically rational, since the benefits from default
rise relative to the potential costs. Variable F is significant
in equation 9 exclusively, however. Apart from the aforementionedTable 2 - Logit Estimates of the Probability of Default for all 53 Sample Countries
3




























































































































































































^or the exact definition of variables, see the text as well as Tables Al and A2j t-statistics in parentheses;.* significant at the 10 per cent level; ** significant
level (two-tailed t-test) . Estijnates for which the algorithm did not converge in 20 steps arc. not reported. - TDuo to multicollinenrity problems, all variables could
in the analysis simultaneously; different sets of explaining variables were selected for which nulticollinearity problems were negligible. Several variables (such as





at the 5 pnr cent
not be considered
A, B, and C) were
Source: Table Al. - Own calculations.16
evidence on the long-term growth variable, other cost factors
were relevant as well. This refers mainly to variables I and K,
notwithstanding that the coefficients are significant in some
equations only. Negative signs of I indicate that the likelihood
of default decreased with higher dependency on foreign develop-
ment aid; the incentive to repudiate debt was stronger when the
possible refusal of creditor governments to grant further assis-
tance involved only small amounts of aid. Similarly, the higher
the potential of sanctions in the form of trade embargos and
foreclosure of export credits was (indicated by K) , the greater
the debtors' reluctance was to willfully stop servicing foreign
debt.
The rather poor results as concerns the overall explanatory power
of the aforementioned logit estimates are not surprising. They
are typical for cross-country analyses based on a fairly hetero-
geneous set of sample economies. In our case, the group of 5 3
countries consisted of extremely poor African and South-Asian
economies with per-capita incomes below 300 US$ in 1980 on the
one hand, and advanced Latin-American countries with incomes of
more than 2000 US$ on the other hand; or else, we referred to
debtors for whom private creditors were of no importance at all
(such as Bangladesh, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, and Somalia,
where private creditors accounted for less than 3 per cent of
total debt in 1980) , and debtors for whom the relations with
commercial banks were of overriding importance (such as Algeria,
Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, where the respective shares ex-
ceeded 80 per cent; for details, see Table Al). We thus decided
to reduce the sample heterogeneity by imposing restrictions in
terms of income levels and the structure of foreign indebtedness.
Table 3 reports the logit estimates achieved on the basis of the
36 sample countries for which the credits from private sources
accounted for more than 25 per cent of total (public and publicly
guaranteed) debt. It was to be expected that the cost-benefit
calculus with respect to defaults on commercial-bank credits
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aShare of private creditors in total (public and publicly guaranteed) debt > 25 per cent. For the exact definition of variables, see the text as well as Tables Al and A2; t-statistics
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reported. - TXie to multicollinearity problems, all variables could not be considered in the analysis simultaneously; different sets of explaining variables were selected for which
multicollinearity problems were negligible. Several variables (such as A, B, and C) were considered as alternative indicators of the relevance of a specific hypothesis.
Source: Table Al. - (Xm calculations.18
debt repudiation . Actually, the explanatory power of the logit
estimates improved for this less heterogeneous sample; the es-
timated likelihood increased to up to 67 per cent in equation 11.
However, even this outcome is insufficient to serve as a basis
for predictions on willful default. Apparently, other than the
economic factors considered here had an important impact on the
borrowers
1 default decisions as well. In particular, the band-
wagon effect as a potential means to reduce the costs from de-
fault may be relevant. In a pooled analysis for 10 developing
countries and the 1976-1985 period, Picht [1988] found this fac-
tor to be statistically significant. The governments of debtor
countries were encouraged to opt for default when large borrowers
such as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico took the lead.
All in all, Table 3 confirms the results for the specific vari-
ables, as presented in Table 2 for all 53 sample countries. This
refers particularly to the fairly strong evidence on the long-
term growth variable D. The following differences between the two
sets of estimations are noteworthy:
- Not surprisingly, the development-aid variable I is no longer
significant in any equation run for the restricted sample. For
the countries which strongly relied on commercial debt, the
threat to be cut off from further aid payments in the case of
2
default was not very effective .
-Contrary to I, the threat of trade sanctions of creditors was
somewhat stronger for countries with considerable debt from
private sources. In both cases where K as a measure for import
dependency was included (equations 2 and 11) , the coefficient
is significantly negative.
- The impact of exogenously created liquidity and solvency
problems on default, as captured by the external-shock variable
With the exception of Zaire, this subgroup did not include any
country that renegotiated its public debt with aid consortia
exclusively ("aid" in Table Al).
2
The significance level of the negative coefficients of I im-
proved when the logit estimates were based on the 4 5 countries
with shares of private creditors in total debt of more than 10
per cent (rather than more than 25 per cent) . Since other re-
sults remained largely unaffected, these estimations are not
presented here separately.19
N, remained fairly modest in the case of all 53 sample coun-
tries; whereas N is significantly positive in four out of six
equations in Table 3.
In a second attempt to reduce the sample heterogeneity, we ex-
cluded the countries with very low per-capita incomes from the
logit analysis (Table 4) . The relevance of cost considerations
in deciding on default is largely the same as in Table 3. This
refers to the significantly negative coefficients of variables p
and K, as well as the insignificance of short-term fluctuations
in GDP and exports (G and H, respectively) and development aid
(I) . Similarly, the potential of counterthreats by borrowers,
indicated by variables L and M, continues to lack significance.
The picture is somewhat different as far as the indicators on the
benefits to be reaped from default are concerned. For the rela-
tively advanced debtors (per-capita income > 500 US$ in 1980) ,
some evidence exists that the higher the amount of foreign re-
sources was the borrower could get hold of by default, the higher
the likelihood of debt repudiation was. However, this relation-
ship is only significant in the case of B, i.e., debt outstanding
in per cent of GNP. As concerns the relative benefits from de-
fault as reflected in E, Table 4 provides support to the hypothe-
sis that the likelihood of willful default was higher, when na-
tional income was unexpectedly low. The negative coefficients of
variable E reveal that the resistance to punctually servicing
foreign debt was strengthened, when the borrower had to transfer
a higher share of its national income to the creditors due to
unforeseen income drops.
VI. Conclusions and Open Questions
The empirical evidence on the various hypotheses on willful de-
fault differed considerably. Hardly any support was provided for
When the criterion applied was per-capita income > 400 US$
(1980), 38 countries entered the analysis; in the case of per-
capita income > 500 US$, the sample was reduced to 32 debtors.
In Table 4, only those estimates are reported which reveal
additional informations, or which had to be excluded from Table
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\>nly those estimates are presented which either did not enter Table 3 (since the algorithm did not converge in 20 steps) or which reveal additional informations. Number of countries in-
cluded: 38 in the case of per-capita income > 400 USS; 32 in the case of per-capita income > 500 US$. For the exact definition of variables, see the text as well as Tables Al and A2; t-
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were considered as alternative indicators of the relevance of a specific hypothesis.
Source: Table Al. - Own calculations.21
those factors which indicated the amount of resources the bor-
rower could get hold of by repudiating its debt. Somewhat better
results were achieved with respect to the variables reflecting
the benefits relative to the potential costs of default. As far
as specific cost factors were concerned, the highly significant
long-term growth variable underlined the effectiveness of the
threat to be cut off from international capital markets in the
case of willful default. Other factors such as the dependency on
imports provided further evidence in this respect. Possible
sanctions in the form of reduced public-aid inflows proved to be
relevant for low-income developing countries in the first place.
The explanatory power of the logit analysis applied remained
limited. The overall quality of the estimations was insufficient
to serve as a basis for predictions on willful default.
The preceding analysis was based on the assumption that the de-
cisions on debt repudiation were rational in terms of an economic
calculus of the overall benefits and costs for the developing
countries in question. Moreover, Third-World governments were
supposed to act in the country's best interest, rather than
seeking to maximize their own benefit. Both assumptions appear to
be fairly restrictive, considering our empirical results. Appa-
rently, willful defaults were not only motivated by aggregate
welfare considerations. Further research must show how effective
internal political pressures by specific interest groups were in
inducing the governments to default on foreign debt .
For example, Western commercial banks were sometimes blamed to be
responsible for the severe economic problems of debtor countries,
because the banks insisted on debt-service payments. Public sen-
timents about foreign banks exploiting the developing economies
may have created a climate where willful default was called for,
irrespective of the social costs involved. In this context, the
role of governments has to be analysed in the first place. The
The resistance of influential segments of the debtor countries'
population against macro-economically required adjustment pro-
grams, especially if imposed by foreign parties such as the
International Monetary Fund, demonstrates the relevance of such
a political-economy approach.22
authorities may have strong incentives to strengthen hostile
sentiments against commercial creditors. Such a strategy may be
well-suited to divert the public attention from the government's
own responsibility for economic crises. A principal-agent situa-
tion does not only prevail with respect to the relations between
foreign creditors and borrowing countries. Within the latter, the
population can be considered as the principal, i.e., the owner of
the national productive potential; whereas the government repre-
sents the agent which is able to decide at its discretion as to
how to make use of this potential. In the national context, the
interests of principals and agents are thus likely to differ in a
similar way as it was argued for international creditor-borrower
relations.
In order to arrive at conclusions about possible avenues to re-
turn to more cooperative terms in the international transfer of
capital, both the internal and the external principal-agent rela-
tions must be taken into account. Moreover, the analysis on will-
ful default has to be supplemented by the discussion of sovereign
risk in the case of foreign direct investments, as the principal
alternative to debt financing. It has to be assessed if it is
easier to come to cooperative terms when equity is substituted
for debt. Such a restructuring of development finance may be
favourable since foreign direct investment is essentially private
in nature, on both the investor's and the host country's side;
whereas Third-World governments are strongly involved in debt
financing, either by direct state borrowing or by public guaran-
tees for foreign credits. The shift from public to private debt
and foreign direct investment may foster an efficient use of the
resources transferred [Picht, 1988]. However, recent evidence
also suggests that the shift towards equity finance is not cost-
less [Huss, Nunnenkamp, 1987]; it was shown that the financial
restructuring involves a trade-off between risk reduction for the
borrower and overall economic growth as well as domestic savings
performance [LSchler, Nunnenkamp, 1987]. Thus, a broader empiri-
cal analysis of the net effects is required in order to judge the
validity of the present euphoria with respect to debt-equity
swaps and similar financial innovations.23
Appendix: Definition of Variables
As far as the independent variable is concerned, i.e. the inci-
dence of debt default, we referred to World-Bank informations on
debt reschedulings in the 1981-1984 period [World Bank, 1985, p.
28] . The variable is "1" for countries for which Table Al re-
ports multilateral debt renegotiations with the Paris Club and
other aid consortia (aid), commercial banks (com), or private and
public creditors (both); otherwise the variable is "0".
Data on debt outstanding in 1980 and on the average ratio of
total debt service to GNP in 1978-1980 are from the World Bank's
World Debt Tables. If not otherwise stated, the figures cover
public and publicly guaranteed credits, as well as non-guaranteed
private debt. The share of private creditors in total debt, ap-
plied as a measure to discriminate between important subgroups of
our sample of 53 countries,was calculated on the basis of public
and publicly guaranteed debt. Per-capita incomes of 1980 (US$),
as the second discriminating variable, are presented in World
Bank, World Development Report 1982 (Statistical Annex, Table 1).
Growth rates in GDP per capita (period averages, in real terms)
were taken from UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and De-
velopment Statistics, 1986 Supplement. The standard deviations of
the residuals, considered as indicators of the degree of short-
term fluctuations in per-capita income and nominal exports, were
derived from trend estimates for the 1970-1980 period; the under-
lying data on GDP per capita (in constant prices of domestic
currency) and merchandise exports (in US$, fob) as published in
IMF, International Financial Statistics.
The remaining three variables supposed to explain willful default
were defined as period averages for 1978-1980:
- Development aid per capita of the debtor country's population
includes grants and net loans of official development assis-
tance, both bilateral and multilateral, as presented in OECD,
Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing
For the methodological problems involved, see Section IV.Countries
24
1
- Import dependency was calculated as the percentage share of
(nominal) imports in (nominal) GDP. For both variables, we
referred to the national-accounts section in IMF, International
Financial Statistics, where both imports and GDP are given in
national currency ; consequently, we need not to convert GDP
data into US$.
- The shares of the sample countries in developed countries'
total exports were proxied by the imports of each of the 53
developing economies from the European Community, Japan, and
the United States, expressed as a percentage share of the lat-
ter countries' total exports (as published in IMF, Direction of
Trade Statistics) .
The calculation of the external-shock variable (ES) has to be
explained in some more detail . In order to separate exogenous
world-market effects on the balance-of-payments situation of our
sample countries from influences arising from domestic policies,
the sample countries were assumed to be "small economies"; i.e.,
the determination of export and import prices, international
interest rates, as well as real world-market demand could not be
influenced by any individual debtor country. Thus, ES encompasses
terms-of-trade effects (ES ), interest-rate effects (ES. ), and
real world-demand effects (ES ,) on the country's balance of
payments, all expressed as a percentage share of the sum of the
4 country's nominal exports (X) and nominal imports (M) .
For Venezuela, see Bundesministerium fur wirtschaftliche Zusam-
menarbeit [1980; 1983] .
2
If necessary, the World Bank's World Tables of January 1984
served as a supplementary source.
3
For further methodological procedures, see Balassa [1981, pp.
142ff.]; Nunnenkamp [1986, pp. 51ff.].
4
ES was calculated relative to the value of external trade since
the absolute US$-amount of external shocks was likely to depend
strongly on the overall size of the sample countries. Princi-
pally, it seemed more appropriate to relate ES to the.debtors'
GDP, since this measure presents a better indication of the
exposure to external shocks. Nevertheless, we selected the
former measure since multicollinearity problems were reduced in
this way.25
(Al) ES/(X + M) = (EStQt + ESwd + ESir) / (X + M)
The three elements of ES were calculated for the 1978-1980
period; the preceding years served as the reference period. The
terms-of-trade effects were defined as follows:
198
0 M x
(A2) ES.. = I (MV. . AP" - XV . AP*)
tO
t t=1978 -t t t
(A3) AP
M -P?-P?
(A4) AP* = P* -
where : MV = import volume;
XV = export volume;
P = import prices (unit values);
P = export prices (unit values);
P__,_ = reference prices; average of the 1975-1977
/b
/ • period.
The world-demand effects can be written as:
1980










where : XVW = actual export volume of all world-market sup-
pliers;
XVW
 r = trend export volume of all world-market sup-
pliers; calculated on the basis of average
annual growth of world-export volumes in the
1971-1977 period (6.6 per cent);
WMS_g ,_ = average world-market shares of the sample coun-
1 tries in the 1975-1977 period; calculated on
the basis of export values.
Finally, the third element, i.e. interest-rate effects, was cal-
culated as follows:
Export and import values of merchandise trade, as given in IMF,
International Financial Statistics, deflated by unit-value
indices of exports and imports (1980=100),as presented in
UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statis-
tics, 1986 Supplement.
2
Merchandise exports of sample countries and all world-market
suppliers, as given in IMF, International Financial Statistics.26
1980
(A6) ES. E (Ai.
i
r t=1978
(A7) Ait = it -
where : i - average interest rate on foreign debt; cal-
culated as interest payments in t, relative to
debt outstanding and disbursed at the end of
t-1;
D = debt outstanding and disbursed at end of
period.
All data are from World Bank, World Debt Tables; since suf-
ficient informations on private non-guaranteed debt were not
available for the mid-1970s, the calculations were based on


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Total debt, i.e., private non-guaranteed debt included; in parentheses: public and publicly guaranteed debt. - Ttotal debt service to GNP; period averages. - com = ccmercial-bank
renegotiation; aid = Paris-Club or other aid-consortia renegotiation; both = both commercial-bank and aid-consortia renegotiation. - upuble counting if foreign obligations were re-
scheduled more than once. - Public and publicly guaranteed debt only. - ODA loans and grants; period averages. - ^Period averages. - Standard deviation of residuals. - Imports of
the country in question frcm the European Camvunity, Japan, and the United States as a percentage share in total exports of EEC, Japan and US. - -
lBalancR-of-paymants impact of changes
in the terms of trade, interest rates and real world-market demand in 1978-1980, vis-a-vis 1975-1977; for details of calculations, see the Appendix; "-" indicates a balance-of-payments
alleviation through favourable world-market developments. - ^n per cent of public and publicly guaranteed debt.
Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables. Washington, var. iss.; World Bank, World Development Report. Washington, var. iss.; UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and Development Sta
tistics. 1986 Supplement. New York 1987; OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries. Paris, var. iss.; IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics.
Washington, var. iss.; IMF, International Financial Statistics. Washington, var. iss.; own calculations. t\J
00Table A2 - Pearson Correlation Coefficients among Explaining Variables"
Debt outstanding, 1980
USS per per cent
billion capita of GNP
Debt-ser-b Per-capita














































Development aid, per capita
1978-80
Imports in per cent of GDP,
1978-80
Share in developed countries'
exports , 1978-80
External shocks in per cent





































































































dumber of observations: 53; coefficients of more than 0.32 (0.27; 0.23) are significant at the 1 (2.5; 5) per cent level. - Total debt service to GNP. - Standard deviation of
residuals. - imports of the sample countries from the European Community, Japan, and the United States, as a percentage share of the latter countries' total exports. - TSalance-
of-payments impact of changes in the terms of trade, interest rates, and real world-market demand in 1978-1980, vis-a-vis 1975-1977; for details of calculations, see the Appendix.
Source: Table Al. - CXm calculations.30





per cent of GNP
Debt-service burden ,
1978-80

















































Development aid in per
cent of GDP, 1978-80
Imports in per cent of
GDP, 1978-80
Share in developed coun-
tries' exports , 1978-80
External shocks in per cent
of exports plus imports
6,
1978-80
-0.12 (-0.36) -0.082 (-1.14)
-0.03 (-0.89) -0.070 (-1.17)
0.41 (0.92) -5.6561 (-0.83)
0.28 (0.40) -0.9547 (-0.26)
0.60 (1.54) -0.1057* (-1.71)
0.49 (0.79) -0.0121 (-0.68)
0.04 (0.13) 0.2701 (0.33)
















equation estimated can be written as: P(l) = Cl + exp - (aQ + a^X) ] ;
X denotes the various explaining variables as given in the first column, t-statistics
in parentheses; *significant at the 10 per cent level; number of observations: 53. -
Ttotal debt service to GNP. -
 cStandard deviation of residuals. - imports of the
sample countries from the European Community, Japan, and^the United States, as a per-
centage share of the latter countries' total exports. - "Balance-of-payments impact of
changes in the terms of trade, interest rates, and real world-market demand in 1978-
1980, vis-a-vis 1975-1977; for details of calculations, see the Appendix.
Source: Table Al. - Own calculations.31
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